After a series of crises, many developing countries came to recognize that reducing liquidity risk is an important self-protection. However, they have alternative strategies for the self-protection. The purpose of this paper is to show that macroeconomic impacts might be very different depending on which strategy developing countries will take. In the first part, we investigate what macroeconomic impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk can have in a simple open economy model. When the government keeps foreign reserves constant, an increased aversion to liquidity risk reduces liquid debt and increases illiquid debt. However, its macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing only small current account surpluses. In contrast, when the government responds to the shock, the changed aversion increases foreign reserves and may lead to a rise of liquidity debt. In particular, under some reasonable parameter set, it causes large macroeconomic impacts, including significant current account surpluses. In the second part, we provide several empirical supports to the implications. In particular, we explore how foreign debt maturity structures changed in East Asia. We find that many East Asian economies reduced short-term borrowings temporarily after the crisis but increased short-term borrowings in the early 2000s.
Introduction
In recent literature, it has been widely discussed why the U.S. current account has deteriorated dramatically during the past decade (see, among others, Obstfeld and Rogoff [2004] , Roubini and Setser [2004] , Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa [2005] ). Although the U.S. current account had been in deficit for most of the periods in the 1980s and the 1990s, its deficits had been almost balanced by Japan's current account surpluses until the mid 1990s. However, the U.S. current account started to show a dramatic deterioration after 1997 and is now far from balanced by surpluses of the other industrialized countries (see Figure 1 ). The first strand of studies proposes that the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account primarily reflects a decline of the U.S. domestic saving and an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods. The second strand of studies, in contrast, points out that an increase in the global supply of saving, especially an increase in Asian and Middle Eastern savings, would help to explain the increase in the U.S. current account deficit. In particular, these studies stress a remarkable reversal in global capital flows that has transformed emerging-market economies from borrowers to large net lenders in international capital markets (see, for example, Bernanke [2005] , Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber [2005] , and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas [2006] ).
When looking at the recent remarkable reversal in global capital flows, East Asian economies have been one of the major net lenders after the currency crisis in 1997. Table 1 In this paper, we explore some theoretical and empirical implications of the changed international capital flows in East Asian economies after the currency crisis. During the crisis, East Asian economies with smaller liquid foreign assets had hard time in preventing panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows (see, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini [1999] and Sachs and Radelet [1998] ). Many developing countries thus came to recognize that increased liquidity is an important self-protection against crises. Among the strategies for the self-protection, replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt was initially one popular advice that many economists suggested. However, what most Asian economies have taken more seriously was raising foreign reserves (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee [2005] and Rodrik [2005] ). Foreign exchange reserves held by developing nations, especially East Asian economies, are now record-breaking, and stand at levels that are a multiple of those held by advanced countries. The purpose of this paper is to show that macroeconomic impacts would be very different depending on which strategy developing countries will take for the self-protection.
In the first part of this paper, we investigate what impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk can have on current account and the other macroeconomic variables in a simple open economy model. In the model, each representative agent maximizes the utility function over time. Since Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997) , usefulness of utility-based models has been widely recognized. A key feature in our model is that relative size of net foreign liquid debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility. This is one of the simplest forms that capture costs from holding liquid foreign debts. At period τ, there is an unanticipated shock that increases aversion to liquidity risk. When the government keeps the amount of foreign reserves constant, the increased aversion among private individuals reduces liquid debt and increases illiquid debt. However, because the sum of liquid and illiquid debts does not change much, its macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing only small current account surpluses. In contrast, when both private individuals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase of liquidity risk aversion, the increased aversion increases foreign reserves and may lead to a rise of liquid debt. In particular, under some reasonable parameter set, it causes large macroeconomic impacts, including current account surpluses accompanied by depreciation of the real exchange rate.
In the second part of the paper, we provide some empirical evidence in East Asia that supports to the theoretical implications. In particular, we focus on the changes of foreign debt maturity structures and their implications in East Asian economies. We find that many East Asian economies temporarily reduced short-term borrowings soon after the crisis but increased short-term borrowings in the early 2000's. Since short-term debt is liquid debt, the former change after the crisis is consistent with the case where only private agents responded to the increased aversion to liquidity risk. However, the latter change is consistent with the case where the government also started to respond and accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves.
Since macroeconomic impacts of the increased liquidity risk aversion depend on which strategy the East Asian economies take, our results have several important implications. In particular, accumulating foreign exchange reserves, the U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in the currency compositions. This suggests that substantial rises in foreign exchange reserves will increase capital inflows into the United States. We point out that trade account surpluses have been widening against the United States but not against non-US countries in several Asian economies in the 2000s. Finally, we find that there were substantial depreciations of East Asian real exchange rates against the U.S. dollar even after the economies recovered from the crisis. We discuss that the result is also consistent with the model.
There are several previous studies that address determinants of debt maturity structure. For example, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) argue that international investors with informational disadvantages may choose to lend short-term to better monitor and discipline borrowers (see also Fukuda [2001] and Jeanne [2004] ). Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler (2004) argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt (see also Schmukler and Vesperoni [2006] ).
However, unlike ours, none of them discussed interactions between debt maturity and foreign reserves that prevailed in emerging markets in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up our small open economy model and section 3 discusses its implications under constant foreign reserves. Section 4 discusses macroeconomic consequences when the government chooses foreign reserves so as to minimize its loss function and section 5 presents the simulation results. Section 6 shows some supporting evidence in East Asia and section 7 considers an implication for the US current account deficits. Section 8 discusses implications for real exchange rates. Section 9 summarizes our main results and refers to their implications.
A Small Open Economy Model
The main purpose of our theoretical model is to investigate macroeconomic consequences when the economy suddenly increased its aversion to liquidity risk. We consider a small open economy that produces two composite goods, tradables and nontradables. For analytical simplicity, we assume that outputs of tradables and nontradables, y T and y N , are fixed and constant overtime. Each representative agent in the economy maximizes the following utility function: The budget constraint of the representative agent is
where T t is lump-sum tax, p N t is the price of nontradable good, r A is real interest rate of liquid debt, and r B is real interest rate of illiquid debt. For simplicity, we assume that r B A < r B B = (1/β) -1. The assumption that r A < r B reflects a liquidity premium that makes real interest rate of liquidity debt lower than that of illiquid debt. Since the numeraire is the traded good, the real interest rates and the price of nontradable good are defined in terms of tradables.
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A key feature in equation (1) is that net liquid debt and foreign reserve are in the utility function. In our model, net supply of domestic debt is always zero, so that b A t denotes net liquid foreign debt. We assume that relative size of net liquid foreign debt to foreign reserve reduces the utility. This is one of the simplest forms that capture potential costs from holding liquid foreign debts. Panics in financial markets and sudden reversals in capital flows are more likely to happen when the country has higher (net) levels of liquid foreign debts but are less likely when it has higher levels of foreign reserves. To the extent that ∂C (λb The first-order conditions are derived by maximizing the following Lagrangian:
It holds that c N t = y N in equilibrium. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order conditions thus lead to
Since the numeraire is the traded good, the price of nontradable good p The main purpose of the following analysis is to explore the impacts when the economy suddenly increased its aversion to liquidity risk. To achieve this goal, we explore what impacts an unanticipated change of λ has on various macroeconomic variables. This section first considers the case where the amounts of foreign reserves R t and lump-sum tax T t are exogenously given and remain constant over time. Under the balanced budget, the government issues no bond to finance its activity. This corresponds to the case where only private individuals respond to an unanticipated increase of disutility from liquidity risk.
Suppose that there was an unanticipated increase of λ at period τ. Then, both c 
where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state and the variables with subscript 1 are those in the new steady state. Denoting the change of the variable x's steady state value by Δx, it therefore holds that
Since equations (4b) and (4c) respectively imply that
we also obtain
where
Since there is no net supply of domestic debt, b A t and b B t denote net liquid foreign debt and net illiquid foreign debt respectively. Equations (8a) and (8b) thus imply that the unanticipated decline of λ thus decreases not only the amount of net foreign liquidity debt but also the sum of net foreign liquidity and illiquidity debts. Since the economy's current account balance over period t is defined by
they also indicate that an unanticipated decline of λ improves the current account at period t because R t is constant over time. The inequality (8a) implies that Δc T /Δλ > 0. Since Δμ/Δλ < 0, equation (4a) leads that Δp N /Δλ < 0. These inequalities imply that an unanticipated increase in the aversion decreases consumption of tradable good and leads to the depreciation of the real exchange rate. Since r B > r B A , the shift from liquidity debt to illiquid debt increases the burden of total interest payments. Given consumption of non-tradable good, this decreases both c and p .
However, to the extent that the sum of liquid and illiquid debts does not change much, its macroeconomic impacts are not large, causing only small current account surpluses.
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The Government Loss Minimization Problem
In the last section, we assumed that the amount of foreign reserves is exogenously given. This exercise is useful to see macroeconomic consequences when only private individuals respond to an unanticipated increase in the aversion to liquidity risk. It is, however, natural that the government also chooses the amount of foreign reserves so as to minimize the social costs. The purpose of this section is to explore what impacts an unanticipated change of liquidity risk aversion has on various macroeconomic variables, especially the current account balance, when both private individuals and the government respond to an unanticipated increase in the disutility from liquidity risk. In the analysis, we assume that the government minimizes the following loss function:
In equation (10) When increasing the amount of foreign reserves, the government has alternative methods to finance it.
However, because of the Ricardian equivalence, the government method of finance does not affect resource allocation. We thus focus on the case where the increases of the foreign reserves are solely financed by lump-sum tax increases. In this case, the government budget constraint at period t is written as
where G* is exogenous government expenditure and r is real interest rate of the foreign reserves. We assume that the rate of returns from foreign reserves is very low in international capital market so that r < r A < r B . B Assuming interior solution, the government's first-order conditions that minimizes (10) lead to
Equation (12) means that the government changes the amount of foreign reserves up to the satiation point.
Equations (11) and (12) together with equations (4a)-(4c) and (5a)-(5c) determines the equilibrium allocation when the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves so as to minimize the loss function.
Since there is no net supply of domestic debt, both b 
where the variables with subscript 0 are those in the old steady state and the variables with subscript 1 are those in the new steady state. It therefore holds that
The condition (14) degenerates into the condition (6) when ΔR = 0. However, sinceΔR ≠ 0 when the government optimally chooses R, the following results become very different from those in the last section.
When the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves endogenously, equation (4c) implies
while equation (4b) still leads to (7a). Since equation (12) leads to
we therefore obtain that
where Ω, which is positive, was defined below equations (8a) -(8c).
As you see in (17a), ΔR/Δλ depends on various derivatives and parameters. Therefore, we cannot conclude that ΔR/Δλ is positive in general. However, to the extent that the government chooses the amount of foreign reserves to minimize the liquidity risk, it is natural to suppose that the government increases R when aversion to liquidity risk increases. We thus focus on the case where ΔR/Δλ > 0 in the following analysis. When ΔR/Δλ > 0, equation (17b) 
Some numerical examples
In the last section, we explored what impacts an increased aversion to liquidity risk have on current account and other macro variables when the government minimizes the costs from liquidity risk. However, it is not necessarily clear the magnitude of the impacts without using specific functional forms. The purpose of this section is to explore the quantitative impacts by specifying the functional forms in the model.
In the experiment, we use the following functional forms:
In (18a), the utility from consumption represents the case where an elasticity of substitution in consumption between the tradable good and the nontradable good equals to one. The disutility functions (18b) and (18c) imply that the satiation ratio of b before period τ, the equilibrium values of macro variables are summarized in Table 2 .
In the table, Table 2 - (1) reports the case where the government does not respond to the shock, while Table 2 - (2) reports the case where the government also responds to the shock. The change of λ has very small impacts on Table 2 - (1). In contrast, in Table 2 - (2), the changes of λ and λ G increase R t substantially
and causes large declines of c Table 2 - (2) indicates that under the parameter set and exogenous variables specified above, rises of λ and λ G increase R t , b t and p N t at period τ, and lead to a temporal current account surplus at period τ. We can also see that the changes of these macro variables are substantial in Table 2 -(2). For example, tradable good consumption declines at period τ only by less than 1% in Table 2 - (1) but by nearly 10% in Table 2 - (2). A large decline of b A t +b B t -R t in Table 2 - (2) implies that the economy runs larger substantial current account surplus when the government also responds to the shock than when only the private individuals respond. Table 2 -(1). This reflects the fact that the increased aversion to liquidity risk causes a shift from liquid debt to illiquid debt when private individuals try to reduce the risk. When the government responds to the shock, b Table 2 -(2). It is not clear in general whether the increased liquidity aversion increases b A t or not when both private individuals and the government respond to the shock. But if the government increases R t and reduced the liquidity risk, the private individuals would have less incentive to shift their debts from liquid ones to illiquid ones. Table 2 - (2) shows that this effect can dominate the other under some reasonable parameter set.
However, each of b

The different responses of b
A t and b B t may have interesting implications when the private individuals respond to the shock first and then the government follows it. In this case, the increased liquidity aversion would have very different impacts depending on before or after the government responds. Table 2 -(3) summarizes the changes of macro variables under the circumstance. In Table 2 -(3), we still assume the parameter set and exogenous variables specified above. But we suppose that before period 1, the economy was in the steady state where only private individuals maximized. At period 1, there was an unanticipated shock and the value of λ increased from 1 to 1.1 permanently. At period 1, only private individuals respond to the shock, while the government keeps foreign reserves constant. The changes of the variables from period 0 to period 1 are thus exactly the same as those in Table 2 -(1). However, after period 2, λ G increased from 1 to 1.1 permanently and the government also starts to respond to the shock so as to minimize the loss function. The steady state values are thus adjusted to those in Table 2 -(2).
It is noteworthy that the introduction of the government's minimization reduces the amount of tradable good consumption from 8.32 to 6.36 in Table 2 -(3). This implies that the welfare of the representative agent is not necessarily enhanced by the government's optimization. In fact, when λ = λ G = 1 permanently, we can confirm that the introduction of the government's optimization reduces the lifetime utility of the representative agent from 10.4 to 9.9. This is partly because the government's loss function is different from that of the private agent.
However, low real interest of foreign reserves is another crucial factor that reduces the welfare of the representative agent. The accumulation of foreign reserves is useful in reducing the liquidity risk for the representative agent. However, since the accumulation of foreign reserves reduces available resource, it may deteriorate the welfare of the representative agent through reducing consumption of tradable goods.
Some Evidence in East Asia
After the Asian crisis, most Asian economies came to recognize that economic growth that relies on liquid external borrowings is not desirable, given their vulnerability to a sudden reversal of capital flows. Soon after the crisis, they thus started to increase liquidity as an important self-protection against crises. Our theoretical model, however, implies that they had alternative strategies for the self-protection depending on whether the government cares about liquidity risk or not.
Based on the data in BIS Quarterly Review, Figure 2 reports the changes of short-term, medium-term, and long-term borrowings in seven East Asian economies before and after the crisis. Reflecting dramatic capital inflows into East Asia before the crisis, we can observe large increases of all types of debts in 1995 and 1996.
We can also observe that there were substantial declines of short-term borrowings not only during the crisis but for some periods after the crisis. The declines of short-term borrowings during the crisis clearly happened because of capital flight under the panicking crisis. It is, however, noteworthy that the declines of short-term borrowings continued even in 1998 when East Asian economies started their economic recovery. At the same time, there were dramatic increases of medium-term borrowings and some increases of long-term borrowings in several East Asian economies after the crisis.
These results indicate that many East Asian economies shifted their borrowings from liquid short-term debt to illiquid long-term debts soon after the crisis. However, the shift from liquid debt to illiquid debt did not persist.
Instead, liquid short-term debt increased again in the early 2000s. Korea was the only East Asian country that had significant increases of short-term borrowings since the late 1990s. But several East Asian economies also experienced increases of their short-term borrowings in the early 2000s. In contrast, in the East Asian economies, medium-term debts and long-term debts slowed down their growth and sometimes declined during the same period. This indicates that many East Asian economies might have reversed their maturity structures shifting their borrowings from illiquid long-term debt to liquid short-term debt.
An essentially similar result can be obtained from the alternative data set in Global Development Finance issued by the World Bank. Table 3 Since short-term borrowing is liquid debt and medium-term and long-term borrowings are illiquid debts, shifting their debt from short-term to long-term is consistent with the case where only private agents responded to the increased aversion to liquidity risk in our theoretical model. In contrast, increasing their short-term borrowings and decreasing long-term borrowings are consistent with the case where the government also responded in the model. The above evidence suggests that in East Asia, the former case prevailed soon after the crisis but the latter became dominant in the early 2000s.
Among the strategies for the self-protection, replacing liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt was one of the most popular advices that many economists suggested for developing countries. However, what most Asian economies eventually took was raising foreign reserves. Table 4 reports the ratios of foreign exchange reserves to GDP for ten East Asian economies (Japan, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan) from 1990 to 2004. It shows that the ratios went up substantially after the crisis and showed further increases in the early 2000s except for Indonesia. The ratios are now over 10% in all East Asian economies and over 20% except for Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It is highly possible that the accumulated foreign reserves discouraged the private agents to replace liquid short-term debt by illiquid long-term debt in these economies.
One may argue that the rapid rise in reserves in recent years has little to do with the self-insurance motive, but is instead related to policymakers' desire to prevent the appreciation of their currencies and maintain the competitiveness of their tradable sectors. The aggressive intervention could maintain the competitiveness of their tradable sectors and manifest itself in the massive accumulation of foreign reserves by Asian central banks.
The argument may be relevant in explaining China's reserve accumulation, where de facto dollar peg had been maintained for a long time. To some extent, it may also explain recent reserve accumulation in the other East Asian economies. However, it may not explain why the dramatic rise in foreign reserves started to happen after the crisis because the policymakers had an incentive to maintain the trade competitiveness even before the crisis.
7. An Implication for the US Current Account Deficits
In previous sections, we provided some theoretical and empirical analyses on the changes in international capital flows in East Asian economies after the currency crisis in 1997. The analyses were motivated by what happened in East Asia after the crisis. However, the changes of capital flows in East Asia would have a special implication for the U.S. current account when the government accumulates foreign reserves. This is because the U.S. dollar is the dominant reserve currency in international capital market, so that it became indispensable for developing countries to accumulate the U.S. government bonds that would make crises less likely.
Unfortunately, each government keeps the currency composition of the foreign exchange reserves a well-guarded secret. But IMF annual report provides average currency composition for industrialized countries and developing countries every year. In addition, Tavlas and Ozeki (1991) reported average currency composition for selected Asian countries in the 1980s. 2 Table 5 summarizes the reported currency compositions.
The shares of the U.S. dollar have been high in both industrialized and developing countries. In particular, the shares of the U.S. dollar in developing countries were close to 70% from 1991 to 2001. Although updated data is not available for the selected Asian countries, more than half of these reserves are likely to have been invested in the United Sates, typically U.S. treasuries or other safe U.S. safe assets.
Some comparable data sets are also available from the U.S. side. The U.S. Treasury does have estimates of major foreign holders of treasury securities holdings from 2000 to 2005. Table 6 summarizes the estimates for Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. The changes of treasury securities holdings were modest in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. However, there were dramatic increases of treasury securities holdings in China and Japan. In Korea and Taiwan, the amount of treasury securities holdings was Needless to say, our results do not necessarily deny alternative views in explaining recent increases in the U.S.
current account deficits. One may argue that the recent deterioration in the U.S. current account primarily reflects economic policies and other economic developments within the United States itself. One popular argument for the "made in the U.S.A." explanation of the rising current account deficit focuses on the burgeoning U.S. federal budget deficit. That inadequate U.S. national saving is the source of declining national saving and the current account deficit must be true at some level. However, the so-called twin-deficits hypothesis, that government budget deficits cause current account deficits, does not account for the fact that the U.S. external deficit expanded by about $300 billion between 1996 and 2000, a period during which the federal budget was in surplus and projected to remain so. It seems unlikely, therefore, that changes in the U.S. government budget position can entirely explain the behavior of the U.S. current account over the past decade (see also Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2005) ). The U.S. national saving is currently very low and falls considerably short of domestic capital investment. Of necessity, this shortfall is made up by net foreign borrowing. The increased capital flows from the East Asian economies to the U.S. economy may provide one of the promising answers to the question of why the United States has been borrowing so heavily in international capital markets.
Implications for Real Exchange Rates
One of the byproducts in our theoretical analysis is the impacts of increased liquidity risk aversion on the real exchange rate. If recent current account surpluses in East Asia primarily reflect either an increase in the U.S.
demand for East Asian products or increased productivity of East Asian exports, they would naturally lead to currency appreciation of East Asian currencies in a world of floating exchange rates. However, when the economy increases its liquidity risk aversion, large current account surpluses could persist for long years accompanied by the real exchange rate depreciation. This is particularly true for current account surplus against the United States the currency of which has been widely held as an international reserve currency. The purpose of this section is to investigate these implications empirically. The basic result still remains true even when we use absolute PPP data to evaluate the real exchange rates after the crisis. By using the balanced panel data of the Penn World Table ( (19) log P j /P U.S. = constant + a⋅ log Y j /Y U.S. ,
where P j /P U.S. is the price level of country j relative to the United States, and Y j /Y U.S. is country j's relative income level to the United States. We included log Y j /Y U.S. in the regression because Rogoff (1996) found that the Balassa-Samuelson effect leads to a clear positive association between relative price levels and real incomes. It is noteworthy that the negative coefficient of the post-crisis East Asian dummy is much larger than that of the post-crisis dummy in the absolute value. The result is consistent with our theoretical model where the East Asian economies which increased the liquidity risk aversion had current account surpluses accompanied by the real exchange rate depreciation. The result does not change even if we include the China dummy, the East Europe dummy, and the post-crisis Indonesia dummy. All of the three dummies had significantly negative coefficients.
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However, both the post-crisis dummy and the post-crisis East Asian dummy kept having negative impacts, implying undervaluation outside the United States and larger undervaluation in East Asia after the crisis.
Concluding Remarks
During the last decade, financial globalization has been accompanied by frequent and painful financial crises.
Some of the well-known crises include Mexico in 1995 , East Asia in 1997 , Russia in 1998 , Brazil in 1999 Needless to say, our model is too simple to describe a variety of macroeconomic phenomena in East Asia after the crisis. For example, our model neglected the role of capital stock investment which showed dramatic fluctuations before and after the crisis. It also did not take into account risk premium for long-term debt that prevailed in emerging markets. Incorporating these factors would be left for our future research. 2) Eleven Asia countries are: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
3) t-statistics are in parentheses.
4) Data source is the Penn World Table (PWT 6. 2), where Y j = nominal GDP per capita in country j and P j =price level of Y j . The data was downloaded from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 3) Lower values mean depreciation.
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